Although deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved successful applications in many fields, they are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Adversarial training is one of the most effective methods to improve the robustness of DNNs, and it is generally considered as a minimax point problem that minimizes the loss function and maximizes the perturbation. Therefore, powerful adversarial examples can effectively simulate perturbation maximization to solve the minimax problem. In paper, a novel method was proposed to generate more powerful adversarial examples for robust adversarial training. The main idea is to approximates the output of DNNs in the input neighborhood by using the Taylor expansion, and then optimizes it by using the Lagrange multiplier method to generate adversarial examples. The experiment results show it can effectively improve the robust of DNNs trained with these powerful adversarial examples.
Introduction
DNNs have achieved successful applications in many fields such as bioinformatics [1, 2] , speech recognition [3, 4] , and computer vision [5, 6] . However, recent work has found that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Szeigy et al. [7] first noticed the existence of adversarial examples of DNNs in the image classification domain: a natural image added with a tiny perturbation can deceive the DNN to produce an incorrect prediction. These adversarial examples often have good concealment and harmfulness, as it is hard for human vision to detect them. The existence of adversarial examples caused widespread concern. Researchers have explored DNN properties and proposed many typical attack methods such as FGSM [8] , JSMA [9] , Deepfool [10] , C&W [11] , PGD [12] , M-DI 2 -FGSM [13] etc. to generate adversarial examples.
The generation of adversarial examples can usually be modeled as the optimization problem of the loss function with respect to the input. Due to the high nonlinearity of DNNs, it is very difficult to solve this optimization problem. In this paper, a method is proposed using Taylor expansion to approximate the complicated input-output mapping relationship of DNNs in a small neighborhood of the input example (using p L norms constraints) to replace the nonlinear part of DNNs. After that, we construct a dual problem with Lagrange multiplier method. Since the output of the quadratic Taylor expansion can be approximated to the predicted output of DNNs in a tiny neighbourhood of the input, obtaining adversarial examples directly on DNNs is equivalent to obtain it on a similar quadratic function from the view of classification. The advantages of our method are: (1) It can effectively avoid falling into local optimizations; (2) The dual problem based on the Lagrange multiplier method is capable of exactly calculate the extreme value; (3) It can be used to estimate the robust upper bound of DNNs accurately. Therefore, compared with other multi-step attack methods, our method has advantages on both calculation accuracy and speed.
Since our method can avoid falling into local optimizations, compared with one-step attack methods, it is closer to the optimal solution and the generated adversarial examples are more powerful. The experimental results show that adversarial examples generated by our method have high transferability and good concealment. As a result, adversarial training with our adversarial examples can effectively improve the robustness of DNNs.
The main innovations and contributions of our work can be summarized as follows: (1) We apply Taylor theorem in small field ( p L norms constraints) of input, generating a quadratic Taylor expansion which has similar output to DNNs. Compared with all previous methods, this method can avoid being trapped by local optimizations, and get more effective adversarial examples.
(2)We systematically evaluated the selection of objective functions, and the experiments show that our method can generate powerfuladversarial examples regardless of the defense of gradient mask for DNNs.
(3)Experimental evaluation was conducted on MNIST and cifar-10 dataset. It is proved by the reliable experiment that our adversarial examples have high transferability and are capable of improving the robustness of DNNs through adversarial training. To make it easier for its researchers to use our work to evaluate the robustness of other defense systems, The complete code is available at https://github.com/zhangximin2019/zhangximin 2 
Background
This section provides background on our work, covering the fundamentals of DNNs and the most representative attack methods available nowadays. ( 1) 
Deep Neural Networks and Notation
output vector of the previous layer (also known as the last hidden layer). The final prediction label is obtained by
Adversarial Examples of DNNs
Szegedy et al. [7] first found the existence of adversarial examples in DNNs. More formally, in the space m n  R , we think of an image X which size is m n  as a point. Our goal is to find a point , p X X C       which is in the constraint and is close enough to X . Such point X  is called the adversarial example. This X  and X belong to the same category from the perspective of human eye, but the subtle perturbation  deceives DNNs into judging it as a different class from X , i.e ( ) ( ) . .
In general, the perturbation  is constrained by the p
Threat Models in Deep Learning
There are a number of methods to generate adversarial examples, but they are all have constraints. Since the capability of adversarial examples or the robustness of the attack is based upon what adversary is allowed to do. Without such limitation, adversary can replace the given image with any image, violating the definition of adversarial examples. To this end, we define these assumptions as threat models, which typically include attack targets and attack capabilities.
(1) Adversarial Goals Adversarial goals in threat models can be defined as a specific formula that needs to be detected and defended. In DNNs, the classification of adversarial Goals is helpful for us to define this specific formula. Therefore, in threat models, the classification of adversarial goals is very important. In this paper, adversarial goals are divided into two categories: (a)Untargeted attack:
misclassify adversarial examples to any incorrect class; (b)Targeted attack: misclassify adversarial examples to specified incorrect class.
In this paper, both untargeted attack and targeted attack are based on the change of confidence, and the method in this paper is the first attack method to reduce confidence through optimization method from the mathematical perspective to generate adversarial examples.
(2 Because the gradient information of target DNNs needs to be mastered, the method in this paper belongs to white box attack. However, since adversarial examples generated by the method in this paper is highly transferable, it is easy to build the agent DNNs locally through the method in the paper [18] to successfully realize the black box attack.
Attack algorithms
We selected some typical gradient-based methods to compare with the methods proposed in this paper. The existing typical methods include FGSM, JSMA, Deepfool, C&W, PGD, 
where J is the loss function,  is the perturbation limit on the sign gradient direction ( )  sign .
FGSM has the advantages of low computational complexity and the ability to generate a large number of adversarial examples in a short time.
(2)JSMA Papernotet al. [9] proposed a targeted attack method under 0 L distance. According to the adversarial saliency maps, the input components were ranked in descending order, and the components with strong adversarial saliency were selected to add perturbation  . For the target class t , adversarial saliency map of component S(X, t)[ ] i is defined as :
 represents DNNs Jacobian matrix.
(3)Deepfool
Moosav-dezfooli et al. [10] proposed the Deepfool method, which employs linear approximation for gradient iterative attack. For a binary classifier, the following iterative process can be used to describe:
(4) C&W
Carlini and Wagner proposed a targeted iterative attack method based on gradient descent.
Based on their further studies [11, 19, 20] , C&W attacks are effective against most existing defenses. They modeled the process of generating the adversarial examples as the following optimization problem, minimizing the disturbance while maximizing the model classification error:
If and only if
Through experimental evaluation, they found that the most effective function g was:
( ) max(max(Softmax( ) ) Softmax( ) , )
Where k is the constant that controls confidence.
(5) PGD
Aleksander et al. [12] explained the process of generating adversarial examples as a simple one-step solution to solve the internal maximization problem of saddle point problem. Based on this, they proposed a derivative method of FGSM, called PGD. The essence of this method is to project gradient descent on the loss function:
( sign( ( ( ; ), ))) For untargeted attack, it is to reduce the confidence of the correct output class; for targeted attack, it is to improve the confidence of the target class. Therefore, the core of the proposed method is constructing a quadratic Taylor expansion to approximate the complicated input output projection of DNNs in a small neighbourhood of the input example by using gradient information. Then, the Lagrange multiplier method is used to construct the dual function and calculate the extreme value to obtain the perturbation  .
The first step of our method is to calculate the gradient information of DNNs. Considering that the output of the last hidden layer and the Softmax layer of DNNs can both provide gradient information of DNNs, while the output of the Softmax layer is the output of the last hidden layer after normalization. The normalized Softmax layer will smooth the gradient, and the author of [9] insist on using the last hidden layer for the calculation. This is justified by the extreme variations introduced by the logistic regression computed between these two layers to ensure probabilities sum up to 1, leading to extreme derivative values. They believe this reduces the quality of information on how the neurons are activated by different inputs. In this paper, the gradient was calculated and tested on the last hidden layer and Softmax layer respectively to analyze the difference. The output of the last hidden layer is called Logist vector , and the output of the Softmax layer is called confidence vector in our paper.
Considering that adversarial examples are obtained in a little neighbourhood, where the output of DNNs may still be highly nonlinear, it is prone to fall into the local optimal value even if the multi-step iteration is adopted. For this reason, the output of DNNs at the last hidden layer or Softmax layer is derived by making use of Taylor series expression. The nonconvex and nonlinear part of DNNs is replaced by a simple quadratic function. Then, the Lagrange multiplier method is used to construct the dual function and add the constraint to form an optimization formula that is easy to calculate. In this way, effective perturbation values can be obtained to generate adversarial example X  .
Problem Formulation
This section will choose the objective function and establish the optimization model according to the attack target in 2.2. Assume that adversarial examples are generated on the last hidden layer. The output of each neuron in the last hidden layer of DNNs is the logist value assigned to the class that the neuron represents, and the predict label
That is, the greater the value of i z , the more likely it is to be classified as the -th i class, and vice versa. Since the purpose of adversarial examples X  is to add a small amount of perturbation leading to the misclassification of DNNs. Therefore, assuming ( , ) j X y , our goal is to find a small perturbation  , so that the logist value ( ) j z X   is as small as possible, which means that the lower the probability of X   being classified as the -th j class, the higher the probability that DNNs produces misclassification.
Assume that the output of the Softmax layer is used as a reference to generate adversarial examples. Y coming out from the Softmax layer represents the normalized confidence of different classes. The larger the value of i Y , the more likely it is to be classified as the -th i class , and vice versa. The difference from the last hidden layer is that the output of the Softmax layer is normalized, which means that the drop in
Intuitively, reducing the confidence of the correct class at the Softmax layer is more helpful in generating adversarial examples. Our results show that normalization does not make a big difference to our approach. At this point, our method is more adaptable than the first-order gradient information based attack represented by JSMA.
We modeled the process of calculating optimal perturbation  as an optimization problem with confidence as the objective function. According to different layers of DNNs and different attack targets, three different objective functions are defined as follows:
represent the output of the correct class of X   in the last hidden layer and the Softmax layer, respectively. If either of these two expressions is reduced to the minimum, the adversarial example can be obtained.
respectively represent the output of target class of X   in the last hidden layer and the Softmax layer. If either of these two expressions is raised to the highest level, targeted adversarial example will be generated.
represent the difference values of target class output and maximum class output on the last hidden layer and Softmax layer respectively. When the difference value reaches the maximum, the probability of generating targeted adversarial example is the maximum.
(1)Untargeted Atteck
Our goal is to find δ in the constraint that minimizes (X + δ) j f . Therefore, according to the expression of adversarial examples in [7] , we describe the problem of finding perturbation δ for X and constructing adversarial examples as:
Suppose t is the target class, then the goal is to find the δ that maximizes (X + δ) t f within the constraint. We model this process as:
This paper studies a special input case, that is, the benign sample X is not a meaningful natural picture, it may be a pure black or white picture, or it may be a meaningless messy code.
Our adversarial examples can trick DNNs and classify adversarial examples into our target class t . We add a condition (X) F i  to equation (12).
Generate adversarial examples based on the Taylor expansion
For DNNs, we propose a novel adversarial example generation algorithm, and prove its effectiveness in later experiments. Note that both the objective function i z and i f in section 3.1 can use the same method to solve the gradient information. Therefore, for the convenience of narration, i z and i f are uniformly denoted as F in this section.
We use quadratic Taylor expansion to approximate the nonlinear part of F in the neighbourhood of X , transforming the constrained nonlinear optimization problem into a constrained linear optimization problem, and then use Lagrange multiplier method to construct the dual problem to find the optimal solution within the p L norms constraints. This process not only reduces the difficulty of solving the optimization problem, but also improves the solution accuracy.
(1) Compute the gradient matrix ( ) F X  and Hessian matrix 2 ( ) F X  for the given sample X.
(2) Use Taylor expansion to approximate y F in the neighbourhood ( , )
X  is the moving point in the neighbourhood. ( ) y F X  is the logist or Softmax value of X  that is classified as y . The lower the value, the lower the probability of being judged as the -th i class, the higher the probability of being misclassified.
(3) Calculate  by using the Lagrange multiplier method: In equation (3),  is the only unknown. Therefore, we transform the problem of generating adversarial examples into a nonlinear optimization problem under inequality constraints:
We construct the Lagrange function:
The nonlinear optimization problem with inequality constraints is transformed into an unconstrained optimization problem. For better calculation, the original problem (16) is transformed into a dual problem:
Where the dual function
According to the weak duality property, the optimal value d  of equation (18) is the optimal lower bound of the original problem (16) , that is, the convex optimization problem approximates the original problem. The optimal solution of equation (18) must satisfy the KKT condition as follows: If the obtained  satisfies the condition
 , then  is the best perturbation to generate adversarial example. In this way, we obtain the optimal solution  for the optimization problem with inequality constraints through the Lagrange multiplier method, thus generating the adversarial example X  .The above method can be easily extended to all non-cyclic DNNs. The only requirement is that the activation function is differentiable, which has been satisfied by the characteristics of BP algorithm. The whole process is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm1 Generate adversarial examples based on Taylor expansion
X is a benign example Input: X , C Output: 
The KKT condition is used to find the optimal solution 7:
The selection of C is also involved in generating adversarial examples through equation (18) , which is also a very important step. C is used to constrain  . If the value of C is too large, the success rate of generating an adversarial example is higher, but the invisibility of the adversarial example will be weakened, and vice versa. Therefore, the choice of C is crucial.
Empirically,
the most suitable C is the minimum one which satisfies , ( ) ( )
after solving equation (14) . We verify this by running our 1 T from 0 C  on the MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset separately. We plot lines in Figure 2 . Hessian. Therefore, we can also use gauss-newton method to simplify the calculation.
Gauss-Newton Method is a specialized method for minimizing the least squares cost
Given a point X , the pure form of the Gauss-Newton Method is based on
and then minimizing the norm of the linearized function R :
Assuming that the matrix ( ) ( ) T y y F X F X   is invertible, the above quadratic minimization yields:
Notice that because of the high nonlinearity of DNNs, we can't prove the matrix
To ensure descent, and also to deal with the case where the matrix ( )
is singular(as well as enhance convergence when this matrix is nearly singular), the equation (22) is rewrited as follows:
where k  is a stepsize chosen by one of the stepsize rules. The matrix
The algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm2
Generate adversarial examples based on the Gauss-Newton Method X is a benign example 
It can be found that (24) is a saddle point problem, a combination of an inner maximization problem and an outer minimization problem. The inner maximization problem is to find adversarial examples that achieves a high loss. The outer minimization problem is to find the model parameters that can minimize the adversarial loss under some kind of adversarial attack.
Current work on adversarial examples usually focuses on specific defensive mechanisms, or on
attacks against such defenses [12] .An important feature of min-max optimization problem is that attaining small adversarial loss gives a guarantee that targeted attack cannot fool DNNs. By definition, it is possible to construct a robust DNNs which can defense all kinds of attacks. Hence, adversarial training is an optimal balance between model accuracy and robustness.
Equation ( 
Inner maximization problem
The inner maximization problem corresponds to constructing valid adversarial examples, which is a non-concave internal maximum problem. Since this problem requires us to maximize a non-concave function, this is difficult to deal with. Our method approximates the output of the non-concave function in the input neighbourhood through the Taylor expansion function, and then we turn this second order unction into a convex optimization problem by using the dual problem.
Our method is more conducive to finding the extreme value within the constraint range and avoiding falling into the local optimal solution, which is exactly the defect of the existing typical attack methods.
In order to explain that our method can solve the inner maximization problem effectively, we take MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset as examples, and randomly pick up the pictures that can be correctly classified by DNNs for testing.
Experiment in Section 5 showed that, as we had expected, our method which uses the second-order Taylor expansion function to approximate the output of DNNs, and then uses the dual function to transform not only avoid falling into the local optimal value, and find the global optimal solution within the constraint range, but also make sure that the point X found by the second-order function can also be input into DNNs to get the extreme value.
Outer minimization problem
The previous discussion shows that the inner maximization problem can be solved successfully by using our method. In order to train the adversarial network, we also need to solve the outer minimization problem of equation (6), that is, to find the model parameters to minimize the adversarial loss.
The main method to minimize the loss function is stochastic gradient descent (SGD) when training DNNs. An effective way to calculate the gradient of the outer optimization problem is to calculate the gradient of the loss function at the maximum value of the inner problem. This corresponds to adding the adversarial examples to the original training data set in the adversarial training. Of course, it is not clear that this is a valid descent direction for the min-max optimization problem. However, for continuously differentiable functions ,the Danskin theorema classical optimization theorem -states that this is indeed true [12] , and that the gradient of the inner maximization problem corresponds to descent directions for the min-max optimization problem. In 5.2, we will prove the effectiveness of the our method for adversarial training through experiments.
Evaluation
We now use our experimental setup to answer the following questions: (1) 
Experimental Setup
Our experiment will be conducted on MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset to verify the effectiveness of our method. MNIST is a popular handwritten dataset widely used in the machine learning community. It consists of ten classes from digit 0 to 9, containing a total of 70,000 handwritten digit images. We select 60,000 images as training data and 10,000 images as test data.
Each image is in the size of 28×28 pixels.
The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60000 32×32 color images in 10 classes, with 6000 images per class. There are 50000 training images and 10000 test images. The dataset is divided into five training batches and one test batch, each with 10000 images. The test batch contains exactly 1000 randomly-selected images from each class.
We use the standard model for each dataset. For MNIST, we use the standard 3-layer convolutional neural network which achieves 99.2% accuracy. For cifar-10, we trained a standard 4-layer convolutional neural network which achieves 95.3% accuracy.
Evaluating Measure
We use p L , PSNR and ASR to measure the effectiveness of our method. The value of p L is generally used to measure the global or local added perturbation, which is a measure of the T and 6 T . Table 1 and Table 2 show the experimental results. In Table 2 , Best Case, Worst Case and Average Case represent performing the attack against all incorrect classes, and then report the target class that was least difficult to attack, most difficult to attack and a random one among the labels that are not the correct label , respectively. We evaluated the quality and success rate of the adversarial examples generated by six objective functions on MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset. In untargeted attack, the only difference between 1
T and 4
T is that the gradient information of 1 T comes from a hidden layer at the end, while the gradient information of 4 T comes from the Softmax layer. In targeted attack, the difference between 2 T ， 3 T and 5 T ， 6 T is the same.
Experimental results show that the objective function locates at the last hidden layer and locates at the Softmax layer doesn't make very much difference. Under the influence of the normalization of Softmax layer, 4
T ， 5 T and 6 T perform even better than 1 T ， 2 T and 3 T under the same conditions. It suggests that in our method, the normalization caused by the Softmax layer [9] does not reduce the quality of information about how neurons are activated by different inputs.
Therefore, whether or not the defense method smooths the gradient of DNNs [21] , we can get adversarial examples.
B. Compare existing classic methods with our method
To verify the effectiveness of our adversarial examples, we used JSMA, C&W, FGSM, Deepfool and M-DI 2 -FGSM for comparison, where codes of JSMA, C&W, FGSM and Deepfool come from Cleverhans [22] and the codes for PGD and M-DI 2 -FGSM come from the link given by the author in the original text [12, 13] . In addition, to ensure the rigor of the evaluation, we use the same model and the same batch of test data to verify the above methods.
For FGSM, we take 0.01  
. If the target class adversarial examples can be generated within the specified step size, the adversarial examples will be returned for evaluation, otherwise it will be regarded as a failure. As a derivative method of FGSM, PGD has an upper limit 8.0
 
for each pixel on the pixel scale of "0-255". For JSMA, we aim to generate adversarial examples. We extend the constraint on perturbation, and modify the iteration termination condition to classify as the target class successfully. That is, no matter how much perturbation is required, we report success if the attack produce adversarial examples with the correct target label.
But JSMA is unable to run on CIFAR10 due to an inherent significant computational cost for searching saliency map [11] . If we remove the search process, JSMA's ability to generate adversarial examples is greatly reduced. Therefore, we did not use JSMA in the CIFAR10 experiment. Note that CW is a bit different from the above gradient-based methods in that it is an optimization-based attack. In this experiment, 2 L norm attack in C&W is adopted, and we set 1   , learning rate = 0.1. For Deepfool, note that in our implementation, the noise calculated
In our experiment, 500 pictures that could be correctly judged by the initial model were In [9] , JSMA uses the last hidden layer instead of the Softmax layer to calculate the adversarial saliency map. The essence of this approach is to iteratively modify the pixels with the maximum derivative value until adversarial examples is generated or the number of pixels modified exceeds the limit. The authors gave a simple example to show how small input perturbations found using the forward derivative can induce large variations of the neural network output ， but they didn't explain the mathematical derivation. We believe that the mathematical basis of this method comes from the fact that in the neighbourhood of a fixed value X , DNNs satisfy: For small  , there is F(X + δ) However, authors believe that the extreme variations introduced by the Softmax layer lead to extreme derivative values. This reduces the quality of information on how the neurons are activated by different inputs and causes the forward derivative to loose accuracy when generating saliency maps. Therefore they compute the forward derivative of the network using the last hidden layer instead of the Softmax layer. According to equation (3), the author selected the pixel with the maximum value of ( , ) S X t , but essentially wanted to find the pixel with the maximum value of ( ) / t i F X X   as the pixel most conducive to classification as the target class t after adding perturbation. However, without the normalization of the Softmax layer, the author cannot guarantee that the increase of ( ) / t i F X X   will bring the decrease of
the greater the value of ( , ) S X t doesn't mean the greater the value of ( ) / t i F X X   . This means that the pixels selected in the above equation are not technically the key pixels in the targeted attack. We have reason to believe that this is why the capability of JSMA is not as good as we expected. However, our method overcomes this disadvantage. Whether it is in the last hidden layer or in the Softmax layer, the our method can effectively modify pixel points and effectively
generating adversarial examples.
In [11] , C&W is committed to solving minimize ( ) . .
The authors use binary search to determine the value of constant c , which is a mechanical search method that is far less accurate and flexible than the Lagrange multiplier method we use. At the same time, C&W uses 1 (tanh( ) 1) 2
  to expand the search space. Admittedly, this method is very conducive to searching more powerful adversarial examples, but it will also bring a very large search cost. While our method can be successful without having to pay such a high price.
In [12] , PGD transforms constrained optimization problem into unconstrained optimization problem, which is easy to implement and suitable for solving large-scale optimization problems to generate effective adversarial examples. However, in order to ensure the effectiveness of iteration, it takes a long time to calculate the projection of iteration points and the convergence rate is slow.
In addition, when PGD iterates the iteration point from outside to inside of the constraint through Equation (8), part of the iteration information is inevitably lost. In our paper, after approximating the input output mapping relationship of DNNs by using quadratic Taylor expansion, the dual function is constructed by using Lagrange multiplier method to optimize and generate adversarial examples. The Lagrange multiplier method can also transform unconstrained optimization problems into constrained optimization problems. However, unlike the projected gradient descent algorithm, the Lagrange multiplier method does not lose iteration information due to iteration, so the optimization results are more accurate.
Both Deepfool and FGSM often get trapped in local optimum due to their algorithmic characteristics, so the global optimal solution cannot be obtained. In this paper, quadratic Taylor expansion is used to approximate the input output mapping relationship of DNNs, which can effectively skip the local optimum. M-DI 2 -FGSM combines momentum and diverse inputs naturally to form an attack with stronger transferability, but experiments have proved that its ASR is not ideal.
C. Generate adversarial examples for adversarial training based on Taylor Expansion
Based on the discussion in section 4, we can now apply our proposed method to train robust classifiers. Through previous experiments, it can be found that our method can better solve the inner maximization problem in section 4 than the existing classical attack methods. When conducting adversarial training, we can observe that the cross entropy loss decreases continuously to minimize outer problems, as shown in Figure 3 . This result shows that our training is successful, and our method helps to enhance the robustness of DNNs. The attacks based on gradient calculation is divided into single-step attacks [14] and iterative attacks [7, 23] . In general, iterative attacks tend to overfit specific network parameters, although they perform well in white box attacks, but they weaken the transferability of the adversarial examples. However, single-step attacks usually underfit to the network parameters thus producing adversarial examples with slightly better transferability, but it cannot achieve satisfactory results in the white box attack.
Our method obtain the gradient matrix and Hessian matrix for DNNs simultaneously. Then a quadratic Taylor expansion is proposed to approximate the output of DNNs in a small neighbourhood of the input example and it doesn't overfit. Therefore, our method can achieve a good balance between overfitting and underfitting for the network parameters of DNNs, and it performs noticeably well under both white-box and black-box settings. 
D. Generate synthetic digits
Based on the above experiments, we found that we can make any picture into adversarial examples of target class, this theory is also applicable to meaningless pictures. [9] and [11] have both done such experiments. They use all-black image and all-white image to generate adversarial examples that make no sense to humans but misclassified by DNNs . Here is the result. For random synthetic digits in [9] ,one can clearly recognize the target digit, but method in Section 3.3 does not have this flaw. For random synthetic digits in [11] , although the perturbation is very small, its calculation cost is very large, which is greatly inferior to the method in Section 3.3.
Related work
Since Szeigy et al. [7] discovered adversarial examples, the safety of DNNs [24] has become an active research topic. The researchers classified the attack and discussed the adversarial capabilities [25, 26] . Szegedy et al. [7] proposed a box-constrained LBFGS method to generate adversarial examples. Goodfellow et al. [14] proposed FGSM to generate adversarial examples efficiently by performing a single gradient step. Kurakin et al. [23] extended it to an iterative version, and found that the adversarial examples also exist in the physical world. Dong et al. [27] proposed a broad class of momentum-based iterative algorithms to boost the transferability of adversarial examples.
The above work calculates the gradient of DNNs to generate adversarial examples [7, 9, 14, 28, 29] . These work calculates the gradient not to update the weight of DNNs to improve the network, but to update the input and then make DNNs misclassify. They first define the cost function for the output of DNNs and then optimize the cost function to generate adversarial examples. However, these cost functions are often difficult to calculate or have to bear a large computational cost to optimize. Unlike these methods, our method uses a quadratic Taylor expansion to approximate the complicated input output mapping relationship of DNNs in a small neighbourhood of the input example directly. This is an equation that can directly find the extremum in the neighborhood, which is more accurate and requires less computational cost. to increase the robustness of DNNs. Tram`er et al. [31] proposed ensemble adversarial training, which augments training data with perturbations transferred from other models, in order to improve the robustness of DNNs. We recommend using counter training as a defense. Adversarial training requires a large number of effective adversarial examples to be generated at low cost, which is the main purpose of this paper. Min-max optimization problem is considered in confrontational training [32, 33] . However, the results mentioned in [32, 30] are different from those in our paper. Firstly, the authors believes that the inner maximization problem is difficult to solve, and the innovation of the method in this paper overcomes this problem. We approximate the output of DNNs, then the Lagrange multiplier method is used to construct the dual function for optimization. It is proved theoretically and experimentally that our method can obtain the optimal solution for the inner maximization problem. Secondly, they only considered first-order adversarial, and we also experimented with multi-step iterative methods. Furthermore, although the experiments in [33] produced promising results, they were evaluated only on the basis of FGSM. However, the assessment limited to FGSM is not entirely reliable. Therefore, our method is compared with many methods to obtain a more reliable experimental result. 7 
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel and more powerful attack method. We use a quadratic Taylor expansion to approximate the input output mapping relationship of DNNs in a small neighbourhood of the input example (using p L norms constraints), replacing the nonlinear part of DNNs. After that, the Lagrange multiplier method is used to construct the dual function for optimization and calculate the extreme value to generate adversarial examples. This method can efficiently generate a large number of effective adversarial examples at a small cost to solve the inner maximization problem in the min-max optimization problem.
Experimental results on MNIST and CIFAR10 show that compared with the existing classical attack methods, our method has better concealment, transferability, and can significantly improve the robustness of DNNs through adversarial training. Compared with single-step attacks, our method has higher transferability while maintaining the concealment of adversarial examples.
Compared with iterative attacks, our method can solve the internal maximization problem more effectively and accurately. Therefore, our proposed method can be used as a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of DNNs and an effective defense in the future.
